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ABSTRACT
Local government, as administrative units, performs a broad range 
of services that require to establish relations with outside partners, 
including those belonging to the private sector. Public procurement, 
due to the size of the involved financial flows, is government activity 
especially exposed to inefficiencies, corruption and dishonesty. There 
is an everlasting discussion on the ideal size and the range of services 
to be kept ‘in-house’ of local government units (LGUs).Transaction Costs 
Economics (TCE) represents a theoretical paradigm specially designed to 
interpret the issue of efficiency in inter-institutional relations. However, 
even though TCE might be envisaged as a tool for building better systems 
and institutions, practical experience suggests that efficient organization 
of complex multi-institutional systems is still a goal to be met. Therefore, 
public procurement procedures at LGU level are suitable to analyze the 
transaction costs. In an attempt to determine the main organizational 
features of the existing scope of institutions/entities involved in 
delivering services to citizens, we provided an overview of the complexity 
of inter-organizational relations at LGU level. 
In this paper, we present results of an empirical research of public 
procurement procedures from the perspective of LGUs in Croatia. Picking 
up on questionnaire responses from 200 LGUs that reported having held 
over 350 cases of providing services through contract agreements with 
‘independent’ service providers, we formed an opinion of what could be 
the consequences of developing more structured public procurement 
procedures.
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1 Introduction
Economic theory explains organizational arrangements as the results of 
efficient choices. Our motive in this paper was to test this hypothesis on a 
real life sample.
For at least a decade reforming (reorganizing) the public administration of 
Croatia has been one of the most often mentioned phrases appearing in 
national government election campaigns in Croatia, accompanied by the idea 
of increasing efficiency/quality outcomes of public services. A third noticeable 
impulse from the electoral campaign rhetoric was the accented bias towards 
restructuring the public administration system at regional and local level as 
opposed to a more integrative top-down approach.
However, in all these discussions, as it often happens in political discourse, 
little evidence (data) has been laid down for the public to come out with their 
own conclusions; both in terms of the appropriate scope of restructuring 
(whether just diminishing number of units or employees, or more relevantly 
redesigning the scope of activities/jurisdiction of LGU) and in terms of 
expected outcomes. Rather, the impression was that parties were trying to 
provide slogans that appear as quick-fix solutions. But, once the box was 
opened and analytical discussion started, dissonant tones appeared and 
radical changes no longer seem likely.
This research tried to track down data that would provide some evidence of 
local government organization/management/performance issues. The idea 
was that a more precise, process-specific oriented empirical analysis would 
shed more light into the organizational efficiency of local governments, 
allowing us to assess the scope of activities, human capacity and thus question 
the existing size of local government units and distributional arrangements 
(allocation) of tasks and resources. Searching for a representative object 
to focus our research interest we chose to look at the process of public 
procurement at local government level.
Public procurement seemed particularly adequate for introducing issues of 
capacity, efficiency, service quality (quality of life), functional and dysfunctional 
behaviour; and particularly, as an appropriate activity to try interpreting 
existing organizational practices though the lens of TCE. In addition, as we 
had recently been running a questionnaire on public procurement processes 
at local government level, we believed our questionnaire results could provide 
some insight into the capabilities and shortcomings of local governments.
Another rationale for picking up public procurement was that public 
procurement represents important aspect of public administration 
functioning. Savings in this area should be treated as a contribution to 
increasing both economic efficiency and the quality of public services.
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According to OECD, efficiency of procurement can be measured using 
transaction costs and time required for procurement procedures. Efficiency 
can also be measured by observing the existence of specific practices, such 
as the use of e-procurement and of aggregation vehicles like framework 
agreements and consolidated contracts (OECD, ‘Procurement – Key 
Performance Indicators’).
According to European Commission: ‘Every year, over 250 000 public 
authorities in the EU spend around 14% of GDP on the purchase of services, 
works and supplies. In many sectors such as energy, transport, waste 
management, social protection and the provision of health or education 
services, public authorities are the principal buyers. Public procurement refers 
to the process by which public authorities, such as government departments 
or local authorities, purchase work, goods or services from companies.’ 
(European Commission, ‘Public Procurement’)
The European Public Procurement Strategy promotes inquiries into the 
existing organization of public procurement processes: ‘By rethinking the 
entire approach to purchasing, professionalizing public buyers, cutting 
red-tape, and capitalizing on the benefits of the digital revolution, public 
administrations can be made more efficient, more effective, and more citizen 
and business-friendly. Improved governance, the simplification of procedures 
and the greater use of electronic tools in public procurement are also 
important instruments in the fight against fraud and corruption. Finally, as 
the biggest single spender in the EU, the public sector can use procurement to 
drive key EU 2020 horizontal policies, such as those aimed at creating a more 
innovative, green and socially-inclusive economy.’ (European Commission, 
‘Public Procurement Strategy’)
2 Theoretical Concerns
Our basic assumption is that efficiency, being a theoretical concept, is a 
concept subject to interpretation. Basically, being efficient means doing the 
right things in the right way. However, what a particular person or community 
engages in establishing efficient organizational practices, their concepts of 
efficiency may vary in conformance with underlying theory. This is especially 
questionable when it comes to interpretations of real life-organizational 
arrangements and reform efforts.
In the following lines, we try to put down some lines of thought guiding 
our perception of the issues present in choosing adequate organization 
frameworks. Under our first subtitle, we take into consideration simple 
definitions, expressed by public sources, and look at their implications and 
the alignment of these statements with public discourse on government 
reforms in Croatia. Under the second subtitle, we dwell on policy statements 
issued by European authorities. Here again, we try to point to the directions 
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that a simple choice of words will imply for the choice of correct measures to 
be taken in reforming Croatian public administration. 
2.1 A Note on Economic Efficiency
Economic efficiency is defined in terms of input-output ratios; a more efficient 
practice is the one requiring fewer resources for achieving a predefined 
outcome.
The definition above is mainly a ‘technical’ definition, suitable for textbooks, 
but requiring additional ramifications and assumptions in order to fit real-life 
cases. The organizational implication would suggest that a task should be 
designed and then allocated to the organization unit/organizational level best 
capable of acquiring and possessing the most adequate bundle of resources. 
Considering the set of activities needed in public procurement to be more 
of less stable, the question of how to allocate tasks in a national system of 
public procurement to become an issue of capacity (Askim, Christensen, 
Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2010), particularly human; implying that LGUs that are 
smaller in size are incapable of providing minimum capacity levels and should 
thus be considered inefficient. Accordingly, the present public discussion on 
the size of the Croatian local government sector, with the suggested take of 
inefficiency being an issue related to an excessive division and stratification 
of administrative units, appears to be the correct answer to problem of local 
government efficiency.
Yet, according to our standing, the concept of efficiency is more complex. It is 
more than just a question of task description, establishing minimum capacity 
and allocation choices. Considering the passage bellow, representing the 
often cited explanation by Nicholas Barr, the perception of efficient practices 
may be ‘contaminated’ by actors’ involvement (theory will call it strategic 
behaviour of interested parties). Therefore, we should consider the existence 
of more than just one aspect of efficiency. The first sentence explains the 
technical aspect, while the second part of the quote widens the efficiency 
perspective:
‘Economic efficiency is about making the best use of limited resource given 
people’s tastes. It involves the choice of an output bundle X* = (X1, X2, … , Xn) 
where Xi is the output of the ith good, with the property that any deviations 
form this quantities will make at least one person worst off. (…) In broader 
definition of efficiency, three conditions must be hold simultaneously. 
1. Productive efficiency means that activity should be organized to obtain the 
maximum output for given input. This is what engineers think when they speak 
about efficiency. (…) This is not enough for allocative efficiency which requires 
two additional conditions to hold. 2. Efficiency of the product mix means the 
optimum combination of goods should be produced, given existing production 
technology and consumers taste. (…) 3. Efficiency of consumption means that 
a person’s consumption choices should maximize her or his utility – in formal 
terms the marginal rate of substitution must be equal for all individuals.’ (Barr, 
2012, p. 44)
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We can assume that specific manifestations of economic activity, that is, in time 
and place specific cases of organizational arrangements, attitudes towards 
efficiency are even less amenable to simple interpretations regarding the 
reached level of efficiency, let alone estimating the prospective or optimizing 
level of efficiency.
The problem of simplifying the efficiency dilemma is somehow taken up by 
TCE. TCE maintains that organization forms, or precisely formal institutional 
boundaries, matter when it comes to efficiency. Basically, TCE reduces the 
problem of adequate organizational arrangements to the estimation of 
information requirements required to efficiently govern a transaction. In fact, 
TCE rearranges our perception of the efficiency issue by stressing the costs 
(and risks) of information gathering in markets. Market contexts that have 
become ‘contaminated’ by market concentration or external factors, such as 
government interventions, produce higher transaction costs and therefore 
require more planning, i.e. higher administrative costs.2 In short, every 
transactional relationships demands planning and monitoring thus causing 
administrative costs. The difference among specific transactions’ governing 
models lies in the amount and pre-planning (formalization) involved.
Thus, alternative organizational forms can vary from very loose normative 
arrangements that demand little administrative costs, up to fully 
institutionalized control mechanisms achieved by establishing ownership 
rights. The standard phrasing would denote that the arm’s length relationship 
is the organizational arrangement most suitable for competitive market 
situations. A more demanding, and more elaborate arrangement would 
comprise formal contracting. Ownership relations, that imply the highest 
sophistication of planning, would represent the best fit for situations 
involving long-term partnerships, environmental insecurity, institutional 
insecurity, etc. Efficiency is achieved when the optimal institutional 
arrangement is chosen for a specific situation. The efficient organizational 
arrangement will be defined as the one providing the lowest possible 
level administration costs that can still adequately control for a specific 
situation; or in organizational terms, efficiency is achieved when the level of 
imposed behavioural rules (formal organizational arrangements) is kept at 
minimum level necessary that prevents uninformed (=misguided) decision 
making. Therefore, efficient organizational arrangements are the least 
complex sets of norms that can still maintain an adequate level of control 
over the resource or transaction at stake.
Likewise, the efficiency of the procurement process can be addressed in terms 
of transaction costs theory and the duration of procurement procedures.
2 Administrative costs can be understood as a redirection of resources towards main purpose 
(or operational activities) of an organization. In terms of efficiency, as internal, information 
processing, activities increase their share in total available resources, a reduced supply of 
goods and services results as a consequence.
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In conclusion, conformance with transaction costs theory, establishing 
a system of controls (processes, institutions and standards) over public 
procurement requires setting up measures and procedures that do cause 
administrative costs, yet these ‘investments’ can save on the ‘costs of using 
the market’. Efficiency is achieved by balancing the two cost sides. In addition, 
there is the presumption that to be efficient, control systems should be 
based on the specific circumstance under which each institution/relationship 
operates. Therefore, established measures should be pertinent to the activity 
being controlled, but also conform to the specific administrative capacity of 
the government unit applying a specific system of controls.
Another pertinent issue, to be kept in mind while developing our research 
design/arguments, is the ongoing discussion on the adequate size of local 
government in Croatia that tends to heat up during pre-election times. 
In consequence, as the public becomes more sensitized to the issue of 
shaping local government, new facts and data become publicly available and 
researchers are more likely to get cooperative respondents.
2.2 Applying Theory to Understanding Implications of Advice on 
Public Procurement Improvement
Under this topic, we depict some lines from the European Public Procurement 
Strategy (EPPS) that carries influences for organizational structuring. Mainly 
the EPPS points to the importance of public procurement and advises new 
procedures (transparent web-based system) will have a beneficial effect on 
the business sector:
‘…public procurement is critical to the European economic recovery. 
Transparent, fair and competitive public procurement across the Single Market 
creates business opportunities for European enterprises and contributes to 
economic growth and job creation…’ 
On January 5, the European Commission adopted the European Single 
Procurement Document (ESPD) that will considerably reduce the administrative 
burden for companies, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), who want to have a fair chance at winning a public contract… Today’s 
simplification of the tender procedure is one of the major elements of public 
procurement reform which will enter into force on 18 April 2016 … Under 
the new system, suppliers must state that they are able, upon request and 
without delay, to provide the supporting documents necessary to prove 
compliance, unless they are already accessible via public registers.
As explained by the European Commission’s Public Procurement Strategy, 
a web-based system should be established based on a data model that was 
developed in cooperation with a wide range of stakeholders active in the 
field of standardization. Funding from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 
will be made available to facilitate integration of the ESPD into existing 
electronic procurement solutions. The ESPD will allow for the reuse of data 
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filled in by businesses in previous procurement procedures. It is also the entry 
point for the digitization of the qualification phase of public procurement 
(Europena Commission, 2016).
The underlined parts of the sentences above have direct implications on how 
efficiency will be interpreted in practice. Neutral, well-intended statements 
point to the fact that a simple/exact factor, such as form of disseminating 
information or integrated European electronic-procurement solutions, will 
produce desirable results, from standardized procedures, transparency, reuse 
of data, up to economic growth and job creation. The recommendations, in 
fact, fit very well with the theoretical definition of efficiency as a technical 
term suggesting scale economies, the requirement being that tasks should be 
designed and then allocated to the best fit organization unit/organizational 
level. However, by suggesting that efficiency can be measured through 
the ‘aggregation vehicles like framework agreements and consolidated 
contracts’ (OECD, ‘Procurement – Key Performance Indicators’), might also 
lead to pronounced redistribution effects comprising the redistribution of 
authority/activities among levels of government, redistribution of business 
opportunities between smaller and larger businesses, as well as spatial 
redistribution of economic activity; all having a much broader socio-economic 
impact than achieving scale effects in distinct procurement processes. 
On first tentative consideration of additional administrative costs, incurred as 
preparations for the implementation of the above recommendations, we can 
perceive several ‘new investments’, such as:
1. The establishment of national or supranational level body authorized to 
design procedures, set standards, to provide monitoring and eventually 
undertake coordination activities (a standing body or a coordination 
procedure);
2. The analysis of the present system of capacity at LGU level, a redesign 
of LG staff positions and regulations;
3. A review of exiting regulation of LG authority, responsibilities and 
special laws and regulations;
4. An analysis of the impact on local suppliers. As can be seen from 
the Strategy, the aggregation of public purchasing is evident3. Upon 
looking at specific public procurement issues such as thresholds, 
it becomes apparent that local small businesses are not being 
considered. Only under the presumption that procurement cases 
3 The aggregation of public purchasing has started to take hold across the EU. Demand 
aggregation refers to contracting authorities or others operating through Central Purchasing 
Bodies (CPBs) which act as wholesalers or intermediaries. Because aggregators manage 
increasing shares of public procurement markets, they are becoming indispensable players in 
promoting public procurement reform. Moreover, given their different mandates at political, 
policy and market level, CPBs are uniquely positioned to implement strategic or innovative 
procurements. Their role in the standardization of public procurement processes and market 
insight also play an important role for the professionalization of public administrations.
The Commission intends to support the dissemination of good practice and promote the use 
of innovative procurement by CPBs and other forms of aggregation of demand.
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with values bellow thresholds will not be required to follow strictly 
standardized procedures, there would be some space left to 
accommodate ‘local content’;
5. An analysis of redistribution of the cost burden. Namely, even though 
the European Single Procurement Document (ESPD) states that 
‘considerable reducing of the administrative burden for companies’ 
is expected, there is a possibility that the effect to be achieved 
is a redistribution of the tax burden of financing public procedures 
from larger firms to smaller ones. The general public, including small 
businesses, will finances public expenses, but the changes will benefit 
the larger companies that are better equipped for entering the 
electronic bidding process.
In conclusion, with or without explicit intent, organization arrangements 
appear to be developing towards administratively more and more complex 
forms. In this area, our primary concern relates to existing administrative 
capacity at country level. Another concern addresses the redistribution 
of shares of economics activity inside national boundaries. Namely, the 
direction towards authority centralization, rather than decentralization, that 
seems to prevail, suggests a shift of government jobs from local towards 
central governments. We are concerned that a shift may be imposed by 
the redistribution of contracts from smaller towards larger firms,4 possibly 
more important for Croatia, than elsewhere in Europe. Finally, we would 
be interested in analysing the impact of the whole process for the spatial 
redistribution of levels of economic activity.
2.3 A Note on Preventing Corruption
Corruption is a common concern treated in policy documents requiring 
standardization and professionalization of public procurement practices.
OECD estimates corruption to take away between 20 and 25 per cent of 
national procurement budgets worldwide (OECD, 2015). They also advocate 
e-procurement as a measure to fight corruption and offer Korea as an example 
of good outcomes from obtained by switching to e-procurement.5
No one will argue against process analysis that can bring about transparency 
and time savings. We are in favour of standard, better-structured procurement 
processed. However, we would also be in favour of researching the wider 
context that will allow for a better appraisal of the local community outcomes 
that might (unintendedly) result from the process of establishing new public 
4 By keeping high thresholds and demanding staff, equipment, information requirements, 
smaller firms will be brought into an even more unfavorable position towards larger 
enterprises competing for bids.
5 The case refers to South Korea’s e-procurement system KONEPS that is reported to have 
saved the public sector 1.4 billion US$ in costs and the private sector 6.6 billion US$ compared 
to the previous paper-based system. The time it took to process the bids dropped from an 
average of 30 hours to just 2.
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procurement models; such as the aggregation of procurement. However, 
according to a recent study (European Parliament, 2016, p. 58), Croatia, with 
a high relative corruption risk, has relatively low costs of corruption because 
of its low overall value of contracts.
To our understanding, the aggregation of public purchasing is not a measure 
to fight corruption per se. Aggregation may lead to projects becoming 
excessively complex or excessively demanding for smaller scale businesses, 
thus causing a market displacement effect and reducing competition. 
Concentration on the supply side of the market is a theoretical precondition for 
raising prices and possibly collusion. The (theoretical) consequence would be 
higher pricing, so even though payoffs may become less likely (an assumption 
that deserves to be questioned), the impact government spending will still 
be negative. Aggregation is also likely to lead to further centralization of 
decision-making; and therefore, to concentration of authority. We see no 
argument why officials and staff at higher government levels (and managing 
larger expendable funds) should be expected to be less susceptible to 
corruption than those at lower levels of government. Rather, theory would 
expect the opposite (Yilmaz, Beris, & Serrano-Berthet, 2008); those that are 
not controlled by higher levels of authority, those that have more to win by 
bending, would be expected to fall more easily into temptation.
3 Public Procurement at LG Level in Croatia
Local government units in Croatia are, among other state bodies, obligated 
to follow procedures of public procurement for procurement that exceeds 
200,000 HRK in goods and services, or 500,000 HRK in procurement of works 
(Law on public procurement, NN 90/2011, Amendments of the Law on public 
procurement, NN 143/2013).
Table 1. LGU types by population and economic power
Municipa-
lities Cities Counties Zagreb
Average population 2,957 17,668 174,744 790,017
Average LGU Budget (2013) in 
000 HRK 7,662 120,620 182,237 7,106,427
Average LGU Budget per capita 2,903 5,723 1,078 8,995
Sum budget (2013) in 000 HRK 3,287,159 15,198,153 3,644,694 7,106,427
Sum budget as a % of GDP (2013) 1.01% 4.65% 1.12% 2.17%
* Zagreb, as a state capital formally has a status as a city and a county) is because of its size and economic 
power, and in therefore excluded from LGU averages and shown in a separate column.
Source: Ministry of Finance (budgets); Ministry of Public Administrations (population); 
Statistical Yearbook (GDP)
On the first level of territorial structuring, Croatia consists of 557 cities and 
municipalities, which together with 20 counties on second structuring level, 
make up a total of 577 LGUs. However, as it can be seen in Table 1 a vast 
number of small units are financially rather small in economic power. 
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Consequently, on the national scale, the amount of funds used up by public 
procurement at local government is small. 
3.1 Research Methodology
Transaction costs economics (TCE) maintain that organizational arrangements 
saving on the combination of ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs should be 
considered economically superior. Ex-ante costs are defined as costs occurring 
during preparation to contracting or by setting-up a behavioural norms and 
pattern, that is, ex-ante. Mainly these costs are the costs of gathering and 
processing information and ‘bargaining’ until a decision is reached. Ex-post 
costs are considered to be costs of unintended consequences of wrong 
decisions, including costs of remediating bad outcomes, such as bearing 
losses, costs of turning to reverting to less favorable (previously discarded) 
alternatives, switching partners, renegotiating agreements, engaging in 
dispute settlements arrangements.
Because ex-ante costs are expected to be happening at the present time and 
since they have a direct, intuitive, influences on activity levels, ex-ante costs 
are easier to estimate. Likewise, in our research questionnaire ex-ante costs 
received a more extensive set of questions inquiring into the time and costs 
that lead into a partnership agreement. Ex-post cots were accessed mainly 
by inquiring into the number of complaints following a public-procurement 
process, solicited legal advice and delays caused by disputes.
Basically, organizational arrangement in TCE represents levels of control that 
can be achieved in a range of interpersonal/interinstitutional relationships.6 
More complex contractual arrangements are expected to require higher 
‘set-up’ costs for building up safeguards against future, ex-post disruptions in 
functioning of a planned activity. In our research, the typical organizational 
arrangements (‘levels of control’) were represented by:
• short-term contractual arrangement (corresponding to arm’s length 
relationships)
• long-term contractual arrangement (corresponding to long term 
contractual relations – partnerships)
• ownership (corresponding to 100% ownership stake or joint ownership 
with other LGUs)
All three types of organizational arrangements for service delivery exist at 
LG level in Croatia. Public tendering is considered for cases of short-term 
contracts and long-term contracts.
6 In O. Williamson’s words (1985): ‘Progressively increasing the “duration and complexity” of 
contracts has thus resulted in the displacement of even neoclassical adjustment processes 
by adjustment processes of a more thoroughly transaction-specific, ongoing administrative 
kind.’
59Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, letnik 14, št. 4/2016
Procurement at Local Government Level – Issues and Controversies
As asset specificity (or partner specificity) according to Williamson (1985, 
2002) represents a factor that would suggest the desirable level of control over 
a transaction, we substituted the degree of asset specificity by a functional 
identification of the contracting object. Respondents were asked to specify 
the number of deals by each activity area. The offered activity areas were: 
insurance, parks and green areas maintenance, road maintenance, building 
and maintenance of educational and sport facilities, and other communal 
services.
3.2 Research Sample and Data Gathering Process
A questionnaire containing 29 questions (some composite) was run in the 
December of 2014 and addressed to all 577 LGUs in Croatia (municipalities, 
cities and counties). LGUs could access the questionnaire anonymously 
by web application. The questionnaire was accessed by 201 respondents. 
However, the number of respondents on specific questions varied. Among 
the 201 respondents, 98 identified themselves as municipalities, 81 as cities, 
and 7 as counties.
It should be noted that the average number of employees employed by the 
responding LGUs was 63 (mode 4). Further on, they have an average of 4 
organizational subunits (mode 1), and 4 employees, on average were included 
in public procurement procedures (mode 1).
3.3 Research Findings
The number of relationships established with other institutions, whether 
fully owned by LGUs or as partners engaged in a contract arrangement is 
presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Number of relationships by type
TYPE Ownership Long-term partnership
Arm’s length 
relationship
Number of reposted 
relationships 103 78 60
Number of partners
average mode average mode average mode
3.19 1 3.96 0 7.15 0
In 241 reported partnerships, fully or partially owned firms appear as the 
most common organizational arrangement for communal services delivery. 
However, there were still other 138 cases of contracts which might have 
been established though public procurement. It is interesting to note that 
the majority of LGUs did not report to ‘outsource’ service providing at all 
(Therefore the mode=0).
More analytically, using a question designed to get insight into the complexity, 
or homogeneity, of transactional relationships, respondents were asked 
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to report on the number of public procurement procedures carried out in 
the past year. The optional answers provided covered common activity areas, 
such as:
•	 maintenance of green areas;
•	 roads maintenance;
•	 maintenance of schools and educational facilities;
•	 maintenance of sports, cultural facilities;
•	 insurance and;
•	 other communal services.
The answers obtained are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Number of public-procurement procedures run in 2013 by area of activity
Activity area Number Mode % Average
Green areas 27 0 10.96 0.30
Roads 42 1 17.07 1.55
Education facilities 45 1 18.29 1.07
Culture & Sports 48 1 19.51 1.33
Insurance 31 0 12.60 0.42
Other activities 54 1 21.95 9.09
Total reported 246
We	were	also	interested	in	the	influence	of	repeated	contracting	with	same	
partners on transaction costs, as there was a 68% of positive answer to the 
question on whether there were savings to be achieved in repeated bargaining. 
Therefore, we tried to compare long-term and short-term partnerships; yet 
comparing only total sums, we found no evidence of preferences towards 
either long- or short-term partnerships. As can be seen in Table 4, the number 
and structure of long-term and short-term (arm’s length) were reported 
to be at similar level of activities for both types of contract arrangements 
for management of green areas. Infrastructure maintenance, expectedly, 
relied more on long-term partnerships, while unnamed (the answer chosen 
being: other activities) demonstrated a higher proportion of short-term 
arrangements.
Table 4. Number of long-term and short-term contract relations with partner firms 
(2013)
Activity area
Long-term Short-term
number average number average
Green areas 33 0.36 32 0.38
Roads 46 1.09 42 0.79
Water management 37 0.49 30 0.27
Waste management 43 0.60 30 0.27
Other 36 2,03 37 4.70
Total sum 195 191
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Summing up long-term and short-term contractual agreements, we get a 
number of 386 partnerships reported with just a little above the number of 
partnerships existing between LGU and firms held under their ownership 
(listed in Table 5).
Table 5. Number of relations with partner firms in LG ownership (2013)
Activity area Owned Average Mode %
Green areas 82 0.94 1 23.91
Roads 51 0.82 1 14.87
Water management 80 1.04 1 23.32
Waste management 81 1.07 1 23.62
Other 49 2.61 1 14.29
Total sum 343
This could suggest that in Croatia a large proportion of local services (here 
estimated only by number, not value) are performed by publicly owned 
firms. This is consistent with a mode value of 1 suggesting that forms of 
service providing requiring stability in quantities and service quality (water 
and waste management) were served by firms held in ownership relations. 
However, and such is the case of smaller LGUs, it is also quite common to 
have supplementary works arranged for service provision (maintenance) 
with independent contractors. It would be interesting to compare the value/
costs ratios of services being performed under different organizational 
arrangements. However, at this time we did not have the necessary financial 
data at our disposal.7
The problem of transaction costs estimation was addressed by establishing 
the duration of different stages of procurement process. Our respondents 
(n = 71) on average estimate of the total duration of a public procurement 
procedure, from opening the bidding process the picking up the contracting 
party, to be 49.25 days. As a rule, for each tender there were 3 offers, with the 
average number of tender offers being estimated at 3.46. This suggests that 
we should consider the number of bidders to be influenced primarily by legal 
requirements, not so much by some different pricing strategies being exerted 
by bidders, because of which LGUs will would be interested in carrying out 
analytical research into price/value ratios of submitted proposals.
Again, the comparison of average duration of procedures by stages, 
suggests very similar time structures independent of contracting object. 
Again, we suspect the common reason for these similarities to be the 
legal requirements.8 Ex-ante activities, from starting tender preparations 
to running tender procedure were estimated to last on average a little bit 
7 We would need to map cost/value relations under different organizational arrangements 
and see whether shifts occur between costs borne by different constituencies, between 
administration and operation cots and between ex-ante and ex-post costs.
8 On the other hand, there is also the fact that the mode for the number of persons involved in 
public procurement process at the LGU side to be 1 (average = 4), so that we could also reason 
that once a person establishes a routine, he will stick to it. Still this is less likely.
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over the duration required by legal requirements. Again, we tried to get 
data on eventual differences in time structure depending on type of service 
activity. The figures are demonstrated in Table 6.
Table 6. Duration of public procurement by process stage for different types of 
services (days) 
Communal services 
(excluding water, 
sanitation and waste 
management)
Preparation of documentation Submission of tender proposals
average mode average mode
31.34 30 30.36 10
Extension of bidding process Processing proposals and making choice
average mode average mode
6 5 23.71 20
Maintenance of 
educational, cultural 
and sport facilities
Preparation of documentation Submission of tender proposals
average mode average mode
32.04 30 28.04 20
Extension of bidding process Processing proposals and making choice
average mode average mode
7.28 10 25.58 20
Building and 
maintenance 
of  business 
infrastructure
Preparation of documentation Submission of tender proposals
average mode average mode
33.52 30 25.94 10
Extension of bidding process Processing proposals and making choice
average mode average mode
7.41 10 25.19 20
3.4 Remaining Issues Related to Research Results 
It was very interesting to read the free written comments of respondents. 
Respondents, being personally involved in public procurement processes 
suggested correction could be made in the public-procurement process 
in terms of duration of certain process-phases, penalizing unreasonable 
complaints (complaints that one person described as being stated solely 
in order to boycott the process or competitors). In fact, out of 13 written 
comments, 6 pointed to the need to further regulate the bidders’ complain 
process.
Four respondent inputs stressed the problem of selecting bidders upon price; 
what is commonly criticized is the legal definition of ‘best offer’ as being the 
lowest cost offer and the consequent ‘implied guilt’ for acting in favour of 
specific bidder every time the object of transaction is ex-ante specified in 
more details.
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The respondents’ reasoning is conformant with theory expectations. For 
instance, according to Raiffa (2007, p. 178), in negotiations with multiple 
bidders, with competitive sealed bids, the lowest price will be reached when 
bidders believe that other bidders will offer selling at a lower price. Because 
of information asymmetry, bidders are, or can be, unaware of the number 
of other competitors and therefore psychologically persuaded to offer low 
price even when they are the only interested seller.
Along this same line of reasoning, that ex-ante costs are incurred in order 
to control ex-post costs, theory would, in fact, suggest that as object or 
relationship sophistication increases, the more structured should be the 
bidding process and more elaborate the contract items. When the object of 
procurement is standardized, public procurement should prove beneficial in 
reaching the best price, but problems could arise when procuring goods or 
services with higher level of complexity. For example, complexity can arise 
in a form of questionable quality of future product or provided service. Even 
when LGUs devote significant effort into including as many quality and other 
requirements in their tender documentation, thus generating higher ex-ante 
costs, some problems can still be overseen and might create future ex-post 
cost.  Therefore, more complex contractual arrangements could be better 
fitted for private-ordering deals rather than public procurement.
Public procurement can be seen as a way to reach impersonal exchange. In that 
kind of relations everyone is treated the same whether they are personally 
known to each other or not (Wallis, 2011). However, although impersonality 
is, from perspective of institutionalism, important concept in economic 
development, it is still highly theoretical. To avoid ambiguity economic 
subjects are aiming to know at least social identity of their counterparts, 
which, as they believe, should make future disputes less likely and easier to 
solve. Moreover, Halonen-Akatwijuka and Hart (2015, p.4) argue that using 
continuous contracts instead of arm-length ones might prove beneficial. In 
their own words, with continuing contracts ‘there is no obligation to trade in 
the second period but if there are gains from trade the parties will bargain 
using the first period contract as a reference point.’ Therefore, by using 
private ordering, quality concerns and other ambiguities could be avoided or 
easier to handle. That perhaps comes only at risk of not reaching the best 
price or opening extra space for corruption activities.
4 Conclusion
Local government performs a broad range of services that require LGUs 
to establish relations with ‘outside’ partners, including those belonging 
to the private sector. Therefore, they represent a suitable unit of analysis 
when treating transaction costs. In a attempt to determine the main 
organizational features of the existing scope of institutions/entities involved in 
delivering services citizens, this paper provides an overview of the complexity 
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of inter-organizational relations at LGU level. The findings are based on data 
collected through anonymous questionnaires sent to all Croatian LGUs. 
Transaction costs were addressed indirectly, mainly by establishing the 
hardships of establishing and maintaining a transaction relationship.
LGU units accomplish an important share of their activities by engaging in 
contractual relationship with private sector companies. Since the nature of 
these relationships may have long terms implications for service quality and 
costs to be born by society, there are benefits that can be expected from 
a well-designed system or regulating a common and reiterating activity. 
However, the dilemma exists concerning the appropriate level of 
standardization, as well as the attributes of the transaction ‘deserving’ to 
be streamlined in order to optimize cost (and process time) during planning 
activities and during implementation.
Our research demonstrated conformity of procedures and organizational 
arrangements that surpass the expectations of economic theory reasoning 
on efficiency. Mainly, the same patterns of contracting existed for smaller 
and larger financial capacity and any other distinctive feature that might have 
been expected to imply different distribution of tasks. In fact, even the time 
frame of individual process stages was very uniform across our whole sample, 
and vaguely depended on field of activity (which, in theory, would have 
corresponded to variables of task complexity, duration, market transparency, 
partner dependency, etc.).
Precisely, transactions have been observed to occur in two separate 
categories: a) transactions of LGUs with wholly owned communal firms and 
b) transactions with private entities occurring in regular public procurement 
bids. Our rationale was that even though the first relationship represents a 
stable system formally controlled by the LGU, therefore theoretically less 
exposed to transaction risks/costs, both systems are administered by the 
same personnel, suggesting that both sorts of transactions are covered by 
the same (scarce) administrative capacity. 
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POVZETEK
1.01 Izvirni znanstveni članek
Naročila na ravni lokalne samouprave – težave in 
polemike
Javna naročila so pogosto prepoznana kot aktivnost, v katero so vključeni 
znatni finančni tokovi, velikokrat pa so tudi predmet slabega vodenja, celo 
goljufij. Zato javna naročila urejajo številni zakoni in standardi.
Po mnenju OECD je učinkovitost naročila mogoče izmeriti z uporabo 
transakcijskih stroškov in časa, potrebnega za postopke naročanja. 
Učinkovitost je mogoče izmeriti tudi z opazovanjem obstoja določenih praks, 
kot sta uporaba e-naročanja in združevanja orodij, kot so okvirni sporazumi 
in skupinske pogodbe. Ekonomija transakcijskih stroškov (ETS) predstavlja 
teoretično paradigmo, posebej oblikovano za interpretacijo vprašanja 
učinkovitosti v medinstitucionalnih odnosih. Čeprav je ETS mogoče videti kot 
orodje za izgradnjo boljših sistemov in institucij, praktične izkušnje kažejo, da je 
učinkovita organizacija kompleksnih večinstitucionalnih sistemov še vedno cilj, 
ki bi ga bilo treba doseči. Takšno stališče je podprto s Tematskim ciljem EU 11, 
ki poudarja potrebo po ustvarjanju stabilnih, vendar fleksibilnih organizacijskih 
ureditev, ki zagotavljajo javne storitve kot enega izmed prihodnjih ciljev. V 
skladu s teorijo transakcijskih stroškov zahteva vzpostavitev sistema nadzora 
nad procesom javnega naročanja vzpostavitev sistema ukrepov (procese, 
institucije in standarde, ki delujejo povezano, je mogoče razumeti kot sistem 
nadzora). Predpostavka učinkovitosti mora temeljiti na določenih okoliščinah, 
v katerih deluje vsak specifični sistem/institucija/odnos. Zato se mora sistem 
ukrepov nanašati na nadzorovano dejavnost (specifično funkcijo ali storitev), 
vendar mora biti tudi skladen s specifično administrativno zmogljivostjo 
enote, ki izvaja sistem nadzora. Namen tega članka je prispevati k razvoju 
učinkovitega javnega sistema s proučevanjem konteksta določene situacije na 
ravni lokalne samouprave na Hrvaškem.
Drugo relevantno vprašanje je sedanja razprava o velikosti lokalne samouprave 
na Hrvaškem in o njenih pristojnostih. Razprava o idealni velikosti in številu 
enot lokalne samouprave postane zlasti aktualna v predvolilnem času. 
Široki razpon storitev administrativnih enot lokalne samouprave, ki zahteva 
vzpostavljanje odnosov z zunanjimi partnerji, vključno s tistimi, ki pripadajo 
zasebnemu sektorju, pomeni primerno osnovo za analizo pri obravnavi 
transakcijskih stroškov. Ta raziskava poskuša določiti glavne organizacijske 
značilnosti obstoječega nabora institucij/enot, ki so vključene v zagotavljanje 
storitev za državljane, in tako omogoča pregled kompleksnosti odnosov med 
organizacijami na ravni lokalne samouprave.
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Ugotovitve raziskave temeljijo na podatkih, zbranih z anonimnimi vprašalniki, 
ki so bili poslani na naslov vseh hrvaških enot lokalne samouprave. Na podlagi 
izbora odgovorov 200 respondentov, ki so poročali o 350 primerih zagotavljanja 
storitev prek pogodb z neodvisnimi ponudniki storitev, se je oblikovalo 
mnenje o posledicah razvoja bolj strukturiranih postopkov javnih naročil. 
Transakcijski stroški so bili obravnavani posredno, predvsem z razkritjem 
težav pri vzpostavljanju in vzdrževanju transakcijskega razmerja. Transakcije 
so bile opazovane kot dve ločeni kategoriji: a) transakcije z občinskimi podjetji 
v polni lasti in b) transakcije z zasebnimi enotami, ki se pojavljajo pri rednih 
ponudbah v javnih naročilih. Čeprav prvi odnos predstavlja stabilen sistem, 
ki ga formalno nadzoruje enota in je tako teoretično manj izpostavljen 
transakcijskim tveganjem/stroškom, oba sistema upravlja isto osebje, kar 
pomeni, da sta obe vrsti transakcij pokriti in omejeni z enako administrativno 
zmogljivostjo.
Raziskava je poudarila izrazito skladnost postopkov in organizacijskih ureditev 
s pričakovanji ekonomskih teorij. Enaki vzorci sklepanja pogodb so obstajali 
za posle manjšega in večjega obsega ter katerekoli druge razločevalne 
značilnosti, za katere se bi pričakovala drugačna razdelitev nalog. Dejansko 
je bil v celotnem vzorcu tudi časovni okvir individualnih faz procesa zelo 
enoten in je bil le malo odvisen od terenske dejavnosti (ki bi v teoriji ustrezala 
spremenljivkam kompleksnosti naloge, trajanju, tržni transparentnosti, 
partnerski odvisnosti itd.).
